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combining the approaches of Matsuyama (1992) and Barro (1990). In the ensuing model,
industrialization and growth are directly related. Governments may play a role in
industrialization by adopting an optimal fiscal policy, and through improving efficiency.
There is also room for industrial policies that lead to an optimal allocation of resources. The
latter possibility is in contradiction to an open commercial regime that leads to
deindustrialization. The model is used to think about some development experiences,
specially about the slowdown of the Colombian economy since the 1980s.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Industrialization and Economic Growth in Colombia
After the adoption of an open trade regime in 1990, the GDP share of the
Colombian manufacturing industry fell significantly, and the Colombian economy grew on
average much slower than in the past. Is this a coincidence or there exists a connection?
Let us look at the data. Official Colombian statistics (Dane; DNP, 1998) show that
the manufacturing industry GDP share fell continuously from 19.2% in 1990 to 14.3% in
1999 (15.3% in 2000). To gauge the magnitude of this fall, it must be considered that the
manufacturing GDP share was quite stable around 22% during the 1980s.
In order to get rid of cyclical effects and measuring long-run growth trends of the
Colombian GDP, I calculated annual average growth rates per decade as shown in Table 1.
This estimation reveals that the 1990s exhibit the lowest annual average rate of economic
growth since 1925: 2.7%.
Table 1
Long-Run GDP Growth of Colombia 1925-2000
Period 25-30 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Annual Average Rate (%) 4.0 (a) 4.1 3.9 4.6 5.1 5.5 3.4 2.7
Sources: Own calculations based on DNP (1998) and DANE. Note: (a) Available official information on GDP starts in
1925.
Thus, the Colombian “apertura” (commercial openness) did not fulfil some great
expectations.
The behaviour of the Colombian economy during the 1990s is not atypical. In fact, a
direct relationship between industrialization and economic growth seems to be a structural
feature of the Colombian economy. This hypothesis can be assessed by comparing the
evolution of the GDP share of the manufacturing sector with the evolution of the long-run
economic growth rate between 1925 and 2000. As Figure 1 shows, the GDP share of the
manufacturing sector tends to increase from the 1920s to the 1970s –between 1974 and
1979 this share reaches its maximum values around a fairly constant 24%–; as mentioned
above, the manufacturing GDP share falls during the 1980s to a quite stable value of 22%;
and in the 1990s the manufacturing GDP share falls continuously until 1999 –there was a
small recovery of the manufacturing activity in 2000 that does not offset the negative
trend–. On the other hand, see Figure 2, the rate of long-run economic growth of Colombia,
estimated by the moving average of 10 continuous years, behaves in the same way as the
industrialization index: it increases steadily until the end of the 1970s, when it reaches
values quite close to 6%; afterwards it tends to fall and in 2000 it reaches the level of 2.7%.
This economic slowdown of Colombia begins in 1980 with a deindustrialization process;
both phenomena are deepened in the 1990s.
The above comparison does not prove that economic growth in Colombia is driven
by the manufacturing sector. However, no other sector is related with the trend of
Colombian economic growth (see Figure 1): the GDP share of the primary sector decreases
continuously from 1925 to 2000; and the GDP share of the service sector increases steadily
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during the same period. These trends of the primary and the service sectors are consistent
with well-known patterns of economic development (see Chenery, Syrquin and Robinson,
1986). 1
Further analytical evidence of the relationship between industrialization and
economic growth in the Colombian economy is shown by the following regressions:
gt  =  - 0.053 Pt  +  0.317 Mt  +  0.152 St  -  15.902 t
         (-1.123)        (3.487)***   (1.628)       (-2.092)**
         75 observations;  Adjusted R2 = 0.091;  D.W. = 1.45;  Q* = 4.62.
gt  =  - 0.071 Pt  +  0.348 Mt  +  0.162 St  -  17.005 t  +  0.247 AR(1)
         (-1.261)        (3.099)***   (1.477)       (-1.886)*    (2.167)**
          74 observations;  Adjusted R2 = 0.153;
Notes: * significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
In this exercise I run two OLS regressions of the Colombian GDP growth rate (gt) against
the GDP share of the primary sector (Pt), the GDP share of the manufacturing sector (Mt),
the GDP share of the service sector (St), and a time trend (t). Since these shares add up to
unity, a constant term is excluded from these regressions in order to avoid multicollinearity.
The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Both regressions yield that GDP growth is
positively and significantly correlated with the manufacturing GDP share at any
significance level; no other sector share has a significant coefficient. This result might
imply that the main component of economic growth is the growth of the manufacturing
activity. The time trend seems to be negatively related with GDP growth, but its coefficient
is not significant at the 1% level in the first regression, and it is not significant at the 5%
level in the second regression.
The Durbin-Watson statistic of the first regression falls in the uncertainty zone of
the critical values associated to the hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Besides, the Box-
Pierce-Ljung Q* statistic does not reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation at the 3%
level, but it does at the 4%. Thus, the second regression is run to correct the autocorrelation
problem just in case it exists –it is assumed that the error term follows an autoregressive
process of order 1–. The coefficient associated to the lagged residual in the second
regression is significant at the 4% level but it is not at 3%. However, even if autocorrelation
is present this second regression yields that the previously estimated coefficients are robust:
the coefficient of the manufacturing GDP share is similar to the previous one, and it is the
only significant regressor.
Finally, a standard test of stationarity for the regression residual of the first
regression rejects the null hypothesis of unit root: the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic is
estimated as -6.78 against a critical value of -4.09 at the significance level of 1%. As
                                                
1 Figure 1 reveals that changes in Colombian national accounting methods modified the GDP distribution
among sectors in 1950, 1970 and 1990. Nevertheless, the long-run trends of the economic structure are not
significantly altered by the discontinuities.
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expected, a similar result is obtained for the second regression. Thus, these regressions
seem to be valid econometric exercises.2
Still these exercises do not prove any direction of causation: does industrialization
induce economic growth or the other way round? The experience of development seem to
support the causality from industrialization to growth. I will quote later some historic
analysis on development that support this viewpoint.
Let us look now at the experience of development as summarized by Kaldor (1967),
and Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986). In an essay on economic growth of 1967,
Kaldor wrote that “fast rates of growth are almost invariably associated with the fast rate of
growth of the secondary sector, mainly manufacturing, and… this is an attribute of an
intermediate stage of development” (quoted by Nishimizu and Robinson, chapter 10, p.
289, in Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, 1986). No many economists would doubt that the
Colombian economy fits Kaldor´s condition of being at an intermediate level of
development.
Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) also support Kaldor´s conclusion. In the end
of their classical work on industrialization and growth, they ask themselves: “Is
industrialization necessary to continued growth? Our models of the transformation suggest
that the answer is generally yes” (p. 350). Afterwards they warn that this conclusion might
not be true for economies in poverty traps, economies characterized by a persistent Dutch
disease phenomenon, and economies locked in an early development of service exports.
The first two conditions, say Chenery et al, are not probable; and the third condition,
according to these authors, appears unlikely to offset the increasing demand of
manufactures. “In summary, we conclude that –on both empirical and theoretical grounds–
a period in which the share of manufacturing rises substantially is a virtually universal
feature of the structural transformation” (Chenery et al, 1986, p. 350).
The Dutch disease phenomenon is the only exceptional condition mentioned by
Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin that might help to explain the deindustrialization
phenomenon of Colombia. As is well-known, after 1980 Colombia has been increasingly
engaged in drug trafficking activities and it has concentrated this activity in the Andean
zone (Rocha, 2001; Cárdenas, 2002). In addition, Cárdenas (2002) has claimed that the
expansion of drug trafficking and the sequels of violence linked to this activity, together
with the growing income inequality in Colombia, explain the Colombian economic
slowdown.
It may be true that violence and income concentration impinge negatively on
economic growth. However, one might be sceptical that these phenomena explain the
whole picture of the Colombian slowdown since they, in turn, must also be explained. In
any case, deindustrialization as an explanation of the growth slowdown does not
necessarily conflict with other explanations. In fact, since the deindustrialization process
and the upsurge of drug trafficking activities in Colombia began around 1980, they might
                                                
2 According to standard econometric procedures, the integration order of the regressors should be verified
first. Since the econometric model structure is given by a formal identity (the GDP growth rate is by
definition a weighted average of the sectors´ growth rates), the analysis of the residual´s stationarity is
sufficient for the descriptive purposes of this paper.
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be the two sides of the same coin: the specialization process of the Colombian economy
according to its comparative advantages in an increasingly integrated world.
I resort now to economic theory in order to argue for some causality from
industrialization to growth. This analytical background may be helpful to improve our
understanding of the Colombian economic performance after the “apertura”.
1.2. Openness, Learning-by-Doing and Government Spending
Some models of economic growth and international trade that embody dynamic
externalities from learning-by-doing are able to account for the behaviour of the Colombian
economy in the 1990s (Krugman, 1987; Lucas, 1988; Young, l991; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991; Matsuyama, 1992). These models show how openness to international
markets may induce diverse growth effects across countries. In these models, a country
specialization in traditional sectors of lower learning dynamics yields the unwanted effect
that the country´s long-run economic growth is weakened; on the other hand, specialization
in high-learning activities enhances the country´s economic growth. Specialization in
traditional productive activities is a possible outcome of trade liberalization due to a
country´s comparative advantages. In fact, it is nowadays hardly discussed that natural
resource abundance may explain a country´s specialization in primary activities; since these
economic activities have lower learning dynamics the country may be locked in a low level
path of economic growth (Matsuyama, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995a; Landes, 1998).
This seems the case of Colombia after 1990 as the economy has increased its dependency
to mining and agricultural activities: petrol, coal, nickel, bananas, flowers, sugar, and illicit
drugs (marihuana, cocaine and heroin).
Despite diverse theoretical possibilities of openness to international markets, the
received wisdom after the Washington Consensus is that trade liberalization –in the sense
of lower policy-induced barriers to international trade– necessarily enhances economic
growth. In fact, a whole industry of econometric regressions were run in the 1990s in order
to “prove” that trade liberalization is significantly associated with economic growth across
less developed countries (Dollar, 1992; Edwards, 1993, 1998; Lee, 1993; Ben-David, 1993;
Sachs and Warner, 1995b; among many others). Nevertheless, some recent theoretical and
econometric analysis have challenged this conventional wisdom and the corresponding
econometric exercises (see Rodríguez and Rodrik, 1999). These authors found that in many
econometric studies the openness indicators were poor measures of trade barriers or were
highly corrrelated with other sources of bad economic performance; in other cases, the
econometric methods used to ascertain the link between trade policy and economic growth
had serious shortcomings.
As shown above, the Colombian experience with the “apertura” is a case were the
usual prescription of “open-your-markets-and-grow” did not work. On the contrary, this
prescription led the country to deindustrialization and lower economic growth.
In this light it is valid to ask whether the government of a less developed country
can do anything to enhance industrialization and economic growth in the era of
globalisation. Are natural-resource rich countries condemned to primary economic
activities due to the rule of comparative advantage? In order to make a contribution to
answering this question I develop a growth model combining learning effects from
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industrialization à la Matsuyama (1992), and government spending with productive
externalities à la Barro (1990). This model aims at analysing the impact of the government
as provider of public goods on the pattern of trade.
With the exception of Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), Matsuyama´s 1992 paper has
not been given the attention it deserves. Nevertheless, it remains a substantial contribution
to an understanding of the pattern of trade of less developed economies. His model
embodies some basic characteristics of less developed countries. On the supply side,
Matsuyama assumes that agricultural productivity depends basically on each country’s
particular natural conditions. He also assumes that cumulative experience of the
manufacturing industry determines the sector’s productivity. On the demand side,
Matsuyama assumes that consumers require some minimum amount of food.
The assumption on agricultural productivity is fundamental to analyse the role of
natural resources relative abundance on international trade and economic growth. The
assumption on the manufacturing sector learning ability is consistent with the development
experience of the newly industrialized countries; according to some analysts, learning-by-
doing has been one of the most important engines of economic growth of the less
developed countries (Amsden, 1989; Landes, 1998; Lucas, 1988, 1993). On the other hand,
the assumption of the existence of minimum food requirements is consistent with one the
most striking characteristics of underdevelopment: the poverty of a large portion of the
population obliges the almost exclusive satisfaction of basic needs. This assumption is
consistent with Engels´ law: the demand for basic goods is inelastic with respect to income.
Barro´s 1990 model on government spending with productive externalities has
become a classical approach to study the role of government activity and long run growth.
Hence, its choice as the analytical background for this paper does not require much
explanation. It suffices to point out that Barro´s model includes both productive
externalities and a long-run government budget constraint. The model embodies a
sustainable fiscal policy and a role for government in the allocation of resources.
1.3. “Certain Things Will Never Happen if One Doesn't Make Them to Happen”
(Landes, 1998)
There exist other reasons to justify the inclusion of the government in an
international trade model. Government investments may be important for defining a
country´s comparative advantage and inducing economic growth.
One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the Colombian change of trade
regime towards liberalization was the scarce presence of the government. After lowering
tariffs, the Colombian governments did little in order to support the exporting sectors.
Actually, some policies were clearly biased against exports: exports subsidies were
lowered, infrastructural investment was scarce, and the Colombian peso was strongly
revaluated between 1990 and 1999. In addition, unstable  fiscal policies were characteristic
of this period: there was almost a fiscal  reform every two years. In our view, the
Colombian commercial openness lacked sufficient “good” government, and had an
abundance of “bad” government. The “apertura” lacked investment in education, science
and technology, health, roads, ports, etc.; and it had too much corruption and public
inefficiency.
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As a contrast, newly industrializing countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong-Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Israel and China, supported and protected their
industries even before they began the conquest of external industrial markets. Their
fundamental mechanisms of development were learning-by-doing, and economic
diversification through the adoption of foreign technologies. In order for this to happen
these countries had governments whose objectives included a strong commitment to
investment in education. They committed themselves to enhancing agricultural efficiency
through land reforms aimed at democratising the rural property and improving agricultural
productivity [see Amsden (1989) and Landes (1998) for the cases of South Korea and
Japan].
Thus, the inclusion of the government in a learning-by-doing model may help to
understand not only the economic development of Colombia, a case of halfway
industrialization, but also the development of newly industrialized countries.
Moreover, the inclusion of a government role allows a modelling of the historical
criticism that David Landes (1998) aims at those nations that conform to the simple
exploitation of their natural comparative advantages. Portugal, Spain and South American
countries are his favourite targets. Landes is particularly critical of that neo-liberal vision
that places comparative advantage as the rationale of economic growth. He emphasises the
unavoidable role of the state in inducing an industrialization process as shown by the
development experiences of Germany, Japan, South Korea and, in fact, all currently
industrialized countries in their period of economic take-off. Landes´s dictum with respect
to industrialization and development is that “certain things will never happen if one doesn't
make them to happen” (Landes, 1998, chapter 20). That is the key. Since individual agents
cannot transform a development pattern, the government must play a definitive role in the
allocation of resources in order to achieve the required industrial transformations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is developed in the second
section. In the third section the competitive equilibrium in autarchy is solved. The world
competitive equilibrium is solved in the fourth section. The optimal path of the balanced
equilibrium is solved in the fifth section. The article ends with some conclusions in the
sixth section.
2. The Model
2.1. Technologies
The technologies adopt the following Cobb-Douglas form:
(1) .10,1a0,10,)()1( a1 ≤≤<≤≤<−= εαε
α gnAX
(2) .1ba0,10,)( b2 <≤≤≤≤<= αβεβ gnMX
The variables X1 and X2 represent the production of the primary sector and the
manufacturing sector in the period of analysis. A and M are the respective indicators of
productivity. The exponents α, a, β and b are non-negative parameters. Labour supply is
assumed to be constant and normalized to 1. It is also assumed that wages are flexible
(there is full employment). The share of the manufacturing sector in the labour demand is
given by the fraction n. Government spending affects positively labour productivity in both
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sectors. Government spending in the period of analysis is given by g. The effective
spending in productive public goods is given by εg, where ε is a positive fraction; the idea
here is that the relevant variable for production is not the total amount of government
spending but the fraction which is effectively transformed in highways, bridges, hospitals,
professionals, public administration, etc. The remaining fraction corresponds to
government's unproductive expenses –government consumption–, and also to deviation of
resources –corruption–. Land and other natural resources are required for production of
primary goods but they do not appear explicitly in the respective production function
because they are assumed fixed. It is also assumed that relative abundance and quality of
land is reflected directly in the productivity of the sector, A.
The restrictions on the exponents of the production functions have several
implications. First, labour has a decreasing or constant marginal productivity: α ≤ 1 and β ≤
1; as each firm assumes that government spending is constant –or it considers negligible its
effect on aggregate government spending–, a competitive equilibrium may exist. Second, it
is assumed that labour intensity of the primary sector is not inferior to that of the
manufacturing sector: α ≥ β. Third, public goods have a decreasing marginal productivity
in both sectors: a < 1 and b < 1. This assumption guarantees the stability of the model; on
the other hand, it is not sensible to assume that public goods have extraordinary productive
external effects. Fourth, it is assumed that the product elasticity of government spending in
the manufacturing sector is not inferior to the product elasticity of the same spending in the
primary sector: b ≥ a. As a justification of the latter assumption it can be mentioned that the
industrial manufacturing sector depends more heavily than the primary sector on services
which are usually provided for the government because of their high fixed costs and public
character: technological services –energy, communications, science and technology, etc.–,
and services related to the maintenance and expansion of the physical, social and
institutional infrastructure of cities. Not in vain manufacturing industries tend to be located
in big cities.
The scale elasticity of a Cobb-Douglas production function is measured as the sum
of the exponents. Hence, in this model α + a is the scale elasticity in labour and effective
government spending of the primary sector, and β + b is the scale elasticity of the
manufacturing sector. Given the technological assumptions on these exponents, the scale
elasticity is not restricted in any sector: it can be higher, equal or smaller to 1 (increasing,
constant or decreasing scale returns, respectively).
All the above parameter restrictions conform to standard economic assumptions.
Besides, they are consistent with an econometric study of the Colombian productivity
(Sanchez, Rodríguez and Núñez, 1996). These authors assume a Cobb-Douglas technology
specification for the GDP, the manufacturing GDP and the agricultural GDP. Their
productive factors are divided between private factors (capital and labour), and external
factors, which, in turn, are divided in public capital (public infrastructure) and human
capital as measured by the educational level of the population. Sanchez et al postulate that
these technologies are characterized by constant returns to scale with respect to private
factors and public capital, whilst human capital impinges on productivity as a pure
externality. Thus, their results imply increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level. They
estimate the distribution of value added between labour and capital as follows: 63% and
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37% in the manufacturing sector, 80% and 20% in the agricultural sector. Since these
weights correspond to product elasticities in a Cobb-Douglas technology, these estimates
are consistent with our assumption of a decreasing marginal productivity of private factors
(the corresponding product elasticities are lower than 1); they are also consistent with the
assumption that agricultural activities are more labour intensive than manufacturing
activities.
With respect to the effects of external factors on productivity, the results of Sánchez
et al are also consistent with the model assumptions. Table 2 summarizes their estimates of
external factors impact on productivity growth:
Table 2
Impact of Public Capital and Average School-Enrolment Ratio on Productivity
Colombia
Sector Period Public Capital
Elasticity
(t-statistic)
School-Enrolment
Elasticity
(t-statistic)
GDP 1970-1994 0.15 (2.12)** 0.18 (2.30)**
Manufacturing GDP 1955-1994 0.55 (5.59)*** 0.37 (5.27)***
Agricultural GDP (a) 1955-1994 0.29 (3.19)*** 0.27 (3.02)***
                            Source: Sánchez, Rodríguez and Núñez (1996). Notes: (a) Includes cattle production;
                            ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.
This table shows that the impact of public infrastructure growth on manufacturing GDP
growth seems to be almost twice the impact on agricultural growth (0.55 vs. 0.29), and
more than three times the impact on GDP growth (0.55 vs. 0.15). Thus, manufacturing
industry seems to be the economic activity most favoured by public capital accumulation.
These results are also consistent with the model assumption that public capital have a
decreasing marginal productivity (public-capital product elasticities are lower than 1).
Similar results for the industrial activity of Colombia are reported by Cárdenas et al (1995).
Sanchez et al also estimate a positive impact of average educational attainment on
productivity growth as shown by the fourth column of Table 2. Manufacturing industry is
also the one activity most favoured by human capital accumulation.
2.2. The Manufacturing Learning Technology
One of the engines of growth in this economy is the learning-by-doing process of
the industrial manufacturing sector. The process of productivity expansion in this sector
adopts the following linear form:
(3)      ,0,2 >= δδ XM&
where a point on a variable indicates the derivative with respect to time, and δ is the
learning index. Thus, M can be understood as the manufacturing productivity coefficient
and also as the stock of the country manufacturing experience.
In the real world one cannot ignore the existence of learning processes in the
primary sector of the economy. Nevertheless, it is usually assumed that the learning process
of the primary sector is less dynamic because of a lower probability of introduction of new
goods. Besides, it is also assumed that the productivity of the primary sector depends
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fundamentally on given natural conditions. Thus, as in Matsuyama (1992), here it is
assumed that the coefficient of productivity in the primary sector, A, is constant.
2.3. Government Spending and Taxes
In order to provide public goods, the government taxes private incomes. As in Barro
(1990), it is assumed that government spending, g, is contemporaneously balanced with
public revenues:
 (4) ,10,)( 21 ≤≤+= ττ pXXg
where τ is the income tax rate, and p is the relative price of the manufactured good. The
product of the economy, X1 + pX2, and government spending, g, are measured in terms of
the primary good.
The balanced budget is an appropriate assumption for a long-run horizon analysis:
sooner or later the public debt that a fiscal deficit generates should be paid, and a fiscal
surplus is consumed.
2.4. Preferences
In this economy the consumer derives utility from consumption of both the primary
good and the manufactured good. These goods are assumed to be perishable. In
consequence, for the moment it is only necessary to define the utility function of the
representative consumer for the period of analysis:
 (5) ,0,0,log)(log 21 >>+−= γθγθ CCU
where U is the measure of utility, C1 is the consumption of the primary good, and C2 is the
consumption of the manufactured good. This utility function implies that the representative
consumer requires a minimum consumption of the primary good equal to γ. The coefficient
θ measures the consumer's bias toward the primary good.
For minimum consumption in this model it is understood not only the minimum
nutritious requirement, like in Matsuyama’s model, but also other basic consumptions of
primary origin (e.g. fuel).
2.5. Equilibrium in the Markets of Goods
The final private demand in each market is equal to supply after taxes:
(6) ,)1( 11 XC τ−=
(7) .)1( 22 XC τ−=
Equations (1) to (7) define the structural form of the model.
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3. Competitive Equilibrium in Autarchy
3.1. The Behaviour of Firms
Profits of the economic sectors are defined as after-tax income less labour costs: π1
= (1–τ)X1 – w(1–n), and π2 = (1–τ)pX2 – wn, where w is the wage rate. Profit maximization
requires that the after tax value of labour marginal productivity equals the wage:
(8) ,)()1()1( a1 gnAw εατ α−−−=
(9) .)()1( b1 gnMpw εβτ β −−=
To derive these equations it is assumed that firms take as given prices and government
spending. The concavity of the production functions ensures that second order conditions
for maximizing profits are satisfied. The labour distribution between sectors is derived from
the previous expressions:
(10)             .)(
)1(
)ab(
1
1
−
−
−
=
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It is necessary to point out that this equation is not yet a reduced expression: the relative
price of the manufactured good, p, and government spending, g, are endogenous variables.
Figure 3: Labour Distribution and Wage Determination
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Figure 3 shows the determination of wage and labour allocation. Equalization through
economic sectors of the after-tax value of marginal product (V) determines both variables,
w and n.
3.2. Effective Government Spending
To start solving the effective spending in public goods, equations (1), (2), (4) and
(10) are combined. This procedure yields:
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This is not a reduced expression either, as the share of the manufacturing sector in labour
demand, n, is an endogenous expression. Nevertheless, it is convenient to advance that
effective government spending, εg, increases with the share of labour supply in the
manufacturing sector, n. Recall that α > β.
3.3. Engel´s Law
The representative consumer assigns his income so that the ratio of marginal utilities
is equal to the relative price: (∂U/∂X2)/(∂U/∂X1) = p. Developing the previous expression
yields the line of consumption expansion:
 (12)    .21 CpC θγ +=
The minimum level of consumption of the primary good is given by γ units. It implies a
minimum level of income. As income increases, the consumption of both goods grow along
the expansion line as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: The Relative Demand
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Thus the relative demand for the manufactured good increases with income: the slope of an
imaginary line between the origin and the line of consumption expansion increases with the
level of income. Therefore, the utility function satisfies Engel´s law: income elasticity of
demand for the primary good is inferior to 1.
3.4. Labour Allocation
Substitution of the equilibrium equations of the markets of goods [equations (6) and
(7)], in equation (12), and using equation (10), yields
.
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A similar expression to this is derived in Matsuyama´s model. In fact, in his model the
right-hand side of the previous equation is reduced to γ/A, as he does not consider the
existence of government (τ = a = 0). As the left-hand side expression is decreasing in n,
Matsuyama deduces a positive relationship between the primary productivity index, A, and
the industrialization level, n. Notice that the assumption of minimum requirements of
primary consumption, γ  > 0, is fundamental for this result.
In this way Matsuyama models the intuition of development economists who relate
agricultural productivity with industrialization (Nurkse, 1953; Rostow, 1960). Different
arguments have been thought about to explain the positive relationship between agricultural
productivity and industrialization. A high agricultural productivity releases labour force for
urban manufacturing activities. Besides, higher agricultural productivity allows a lower
labour force in the rural areas to feed a bigger urban population. Finally, it has also been
claimed that high revenues in the agricultural sector contribute to create a domestic demand
for industrial products and contribute to generate the savings to finance industrialization.
Since durable goods are not included in Matsuyama´s model, it does not capture the savings
effect, but it does capture the other effects. Matsuyama states that the direct causation
between agricultural productivity and industrialization is valid in the context of a closed
economy, but it ceases to be valid, as it will be seen below, in an open economy
environment.
To obtain the reduced expression for the manufacturing share in labour demand, n,
the expression for the effective government spending, equation (11), is substituted in the
previous expression:
 (13)      [ ][ ] [ ] .)1()1(
/)(1/)1(
)a1/(1aaa1)a1(/)1(
)a1(/a
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−
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As it is not possible to obtain an analytical solution for n, it is convenient to analyse the
form of the previous expression.
Figure 5: Labour Distribution
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Figure 5.1: a ≤ (β+ θ)/(1+θ)   Figure 5.2: a > (β + θ)/(1+ θ) 
The first thing to define is that the right-hand side of equation (13) can be rewritten as
γ/C1(1): the ratio of the minimum consumption of the primary good, γ, to the after-tax
production of the same good when the whole available labour is devoted to primary
activities, C1(1). This ratio is an index of the economy´s primary capacity (it measures the
economy´s ability to fulfil the basic requirements of the population in the extreme case that
all resources should be allocated to the primary sector): the higher this ratio the lower the
primary capacity of the economy. The ratio γ/C1(1) is measured in the vertical axis of
Figures 5.1 and 5.2; it depends on structural parameters of the economy (τ, ε, γ and A); and
it is represented by a horizontal line.
The thick line in Figure 5 represents the value of the left-hand side of equation (13)
for n between 0 and 1. This value is equal to 1 when n = 0; it is nil when n = β/(β+αθ), and
it tends to minus infinity when n tends to 1. If the impact of effective government spending
on primary productivity is relatively weak, a ≤ (β+θ)/(1+ θ) < 1, the left-hand side of
equation (13) is always decreasing in n (Figure 5.1). But if this impact is sufficiently strong,
a > (β+θ)/(1+θ), the left-hand side of equation (13) increases initially with n and decreases
afterwards (Figure 5.2).
The first case coincides analytically with Matsuyama´s model because it does not
consider any external effect of government spending. The second case, Figure 5.2, does not
seem realistic: it implies a big impact of effective government spending on the productivity
of the primary sector, and an even bigger impact on the manufacturing sector if the
hypothesis that this sector receives the biggest benefits from effective government spending
is to be maintained. What seems likely is that external effects from government spending
induce a bias in favour of industrialization but the thick line in Figure 5 preserves its
negative slope.
The first conclusion obtained from the right-hand side of equation (13) is that the
minimum requirements of primary consumption, γ, and the productivity of the primary
sector, A, are just two of the decisive factors of labour allocation. The tax rate, τ, and
government efficiency, ε, are also decisive factors. So, given τ, ε, γ and A, the labour
distribution between the manufacturing sector, n, and the primary sector, 1-n, is solved.
Therefore, in the context of autarchy the government has a role to play in the resource
allocation.
Suppose now that these parameters, τ, ε, γ and A, are given. Thus the ratio γ/C1(1) is
given and it is represented by a horizontal line in Figure 5. In the first case shown in Figure
5.1 −weak impact of government spending in the primary sector−, there are two
possibilities. The economy can be industrialized only if the after-tax production of the
primary sector is sufficiently high: the minimum primary consumption requirements can be
satisfied allocating all the available labour force to the primary sector: γ/C1(1) < 1. If this
condition is not fulfilled, γ/C1(1) > 1, all available labour is allocated to the primary sector
but the society does not even satisfy its basic requirements, and economic growth is nil –it
is possibly the situation of some African countries where the low productivity of the
primary sector is combined with deficient government action–. This last possibility could
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take place for several reasons: low productivity of the primary sector (A ≈ 0), low
government efficiency (ε ≈ 0), a disastrous fiscal policy (τ ≈ 0 or τ ≈ 1), or a combination of
the previous reasons.
In the second case, see Figure 5.2, the external effects of government spending are
strong. If satisfaction of basic requirements is always fulfilled, γ/C1(1) < 1, the analysis is
exactly equal to the previous one, but in this case industrialization is stronger. If the
previous condition is not fulfilled, γ/C1(1) > 1 –whenever the inequality is not too big–, the
economy finds two equilibria: an inferior equilibrium with low industrialization (EI), and a
superior equilibrium with higher industrialization (ES). In the inferior equilibrium there
would be a poverty trap, because bigger primary productivity, or higher government
efficiency induces deindustrialization. In the superior equilibrium the previous analysis is
equivalent to the case of Figure 5.1.
Henceforth the possibility of a poverty trap is ignored; it would imply
simultaneously several extreme conditions: a very strong impact of government spending in
the whole economy, scarce primary productivity, a disastrous fiscal policy, and a mistaken
choice of labour allocation. Thus from now on it is assumed that the thick line of Figure 5
−the left-hand side of equation (13)− diminishes with industrialization, n. Under this
assumption equation (13) implies, like in Matsuyama’s 1992 model, that a higher primary
productivity induces, ceteris paribus, a higher industrialization: ∂n/∂A > 0. As in Barro’s
1990 model, equation (13) implies that an optimal tax rate exists: τoptimal = a, as this tax rate
maximizes the expression (1-τ)1-aτa and, ceteris paribus, maximizes industrialization of the
economy, n. In addition, higher government efficiency induces, ceteris paribus, higher
industrialization: ∂n/∂ε  > 0.
A historical comparison. Japan and South of Korea had efficient governments that
invested in education, health, infrastructure, etc. Besides, their governments induced an
improvement of agricultural productivity through land reform; if the primary sector
experiences a land constraint because of rural property concentration and inadequate use of
land, a land reform process may release unused resources and improve agricultural
productivity. Thus, land reform may be equivalent to an expansion of the A coefficient, the
index of primary productivity. According to this model, both government efficiency and
improvement in agricultural productivity induce industrialization within a context of
autarchy. The situation of Colombia before the “apertura” was completely the opposite:
inefficient governments and failed land reforms. Consequently, the model predicts that
Colombian industrialization was lower than feasible before the “apertura”.
3.5. Economic Growth
The dynamics of the economy is given by the learning process in the manufacturing
industry. Combining equations (2) and (3) yields the growth rate of manufacturing
productivity:
(14) .0)(/ b >= gnMM εδ β&
As effective government spending, εg, increases with n, the growth rate of the industrial
productivity increases with industrialization.
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In this economy primary production is fixed and manufacturing production
increases at the rate given by equation (14). Therefore, industrialization increases social
welfare:
./// 2222 MMXXCCU &&&& ===
3.6. Relative Prices
Before proceeding to the analysis of international trade it is necessary to examine
how relative prices are determined in the closed economy case. Substituting equation (11)
into equation (10) one deduces
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Given the restrictions in the model parameters, the function φ(n) is an increasing function in
n: φ´(n) > 0. In fact, when n = 0, φ = 0; and when n tends to 1, φ tends to infinity. Therefore,
industrialization implies a higher relative price of the manufactured good, p.
4. International  Trade
Consider a large quantity of countries that share identical technologies and
preferences. It is assumed that marginal productivity of labour is decreasing in both
economic activities: α < 1, and β < 1. Given their natural and historical conditions each
country possesses characteristic coefficients of productivity A and M. Likewise, each
country defines its coefficients of economic policy. Given the distribution of countries, one
may define a representative country whose coefficients of primary and manufacturing
productivity are given by A* and M*; its level of government efficiency is given by ε*, and
its tax rate is given by τ*. All countries are small. Therefore, the terms of trade are
determined competitively. Suppose that no costs of transport exist and that international
migration of labour is forbidden. It is also assumed that no country learns from other
people's experience.
Now consider a small country that is initially in autarchy and then opens its doors to
the world markets. Its production functions are identical to those of the rest of the world,
but they are characterized by some technological and political parameters: A, M, ε and τ.
The consumer’s preferences of this country are identical to those of the rest of the world.
The terms of trade are defined for the relative price of the manufacturing good and denoted
with the letter q.
The rest of the world behaves as the closed economy that was previously analysed.
The terms of trade should satisfy equation (15):
(16) .
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The small country labour allocation should also satisfy equation (15) for the given terms of
trade:
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Eliminating the terms of trade, q, one obtains:
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Before analysing the right-hand side of this equation (RHS hereafter), it is useful to deduce
the domestic allocation of labour relative to the rest of the world labour allocation. Since
φ(n) is an increasing function in n –the industrialization index–, n is higher than n* if RHS
is higher than 1, n is equal to n* if RHS is equal to 1, and n is smaller than n* if  RHS is
smaller than 1.
In the third case, RHS < 1, which corresponds to an open economy with
comparative advantage in primary activities –like the Colombian case–, the domestic
economy is less industrialized than the world economy, n < n*. Moreover, this economy
grows slowly than the rest of the world:
.)()(/)(/ b*****b gnMMgnMM εδεδ ββ =<= &&
This result is based on the knowledge that economic growth increases with industrialization
(section 3.5). Even more, the specialization pattern is reinforced. In order to deduce this
result take logarithms of equation (18) and differentiate with respect to time bearing in
mind that n*, A, A*, ε, ε*, τ and τ* are parameters given by the technologies and the
economic policy of the country and of the rest of the world. This operation yields:
.0
)(
)´(
*
*
<−=



M
M
M
M
n
n
n
nn &&&
φ
φ
Since φ´(n) > 0, n decreases in time, thus domestic deindustrialization intensifies and, in
consequence, economic growth of the domestic economy is weakened.
This model does not only generate a gap between the growth rate of less
industrialized countries and the growth rate of industrialized countries, but also the gap
grows in time until reaching a maximum differential. These results are owed to Matsuyama
(1992).
Now, let us analyse the factors affecting the allocation of domestic labour in
equation (18). Firstly, this equation implies that home allocation at home depends on the
country’s relative productivities, A/A* and M/M*; it also depends on home economic
policies compared with external policies, (ετ)/(ε*τ*). Secondly, equation (18) generates the
result that a high relative productivity of primary activities in the country, A >> A*, can
induce ceteris paribus a specialization of the country in primary activities; this result is
contrary, like Matsuyama showed, to the result in autarchy. Under conditions of
commercial openness the law of comparative advantage rules; the primary sector competes
with the secondary sector for labour, if the primary sector is highly productive it can hire
more labour. In the third place, given the external effects of government expenditures, it is
not strange that the model yields the possibility that home economic policy plays an active
role in allocating resources even under commercial openness. Nevertheless, it must be said
that if government spending affects the productivity of sectors in a neutral form, that is the
case when coefficients a and b are equal [see equations (1) and (2)], equation (18) is
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reduced to the equation deduced by Matsuyama in 1992: φ(n)/φ(n*) = (M/A)/(M*/A*),
which depends exclusively on comparative advantages. In such a case the government
cannot affect the domestic allocation of resources. Hence, for a role of the government in
allocating resources in a context of international trade, the external impact of government
spending on manufacturing productivity should be stronger than the external effect on the
primary sector productivity; that is to say, it should be true that b > a, as it was assumed
from the beginning.
Then, assuming that the government has a role to play, the country pattern of
production and international trade will depend both on relative productivities and relative
economic policies. In this situation, the ratio between home primary productivity and
international primary productivity, A/A*, is not as important as the ratio between
international industrial productivity and home industrial productivity, M*/M, because the
first one is raised to an exponent lower than 1: (1-b)/(1-a) < 1. Besides, a relative
improvement in home economic policy efficiency (ε/ε* increases), contribute to
compensate the relative advantage of the country in the primary productivity. Finally, it has
to be said that a naive reading of equation (18) could lead to the wrong conclusion that it
would be optimum for a small country looking for its industrialization in the context of
international commercial openness to fix the maximum income tax (100%). However, in
the Annex it is proved that for this country the optimal tax rate is τoptimal = a, as in the
closed economy case.
5. The Optimal Command
5.1. External Effects and Inefficiency of the Competitive Equilibrium
This economy involves two types of externalities: the effect of government
spending on the economy productivity, and the learning effect of industrial activity on
industrial productivity. From the point of view of social welfare, the growth path of the
decentralized economy is inferior to the optimal path of growth because firms ignore the
external effects in their decisions of labour allocation. Hence, the competitive equilibrium
exhibits a scarce industrialization.
To prove the previous statements a function of intertemporal utility is required; only
in this way the learning impact of industrial activity on the economy can be valued. For the
case it is enough to postulate as an objective function the discounted sum of instantaneous
utilities over an infinite horizon:
(19) ∫ ∞ −0 ,)( dttUe tρ
where the instantaneous utility, U(t), is defined by equation (5), and ρ is the discount rate.
Given the complexity of the interactions considered in this model, the calculation of
the economy optimal path becomes a mathematically intractable problem. Therefore, with
the reader's bow, in this paper the optimal command of this economy is solved only for the
particular case in which marginal labour productivity is constant (Ricardian technology).
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The sacrifice in generality is compensated with tractable mathematical expressions and a
simple allocation of labour in the open economy case.
Before analysing the optimal allocation of resources it is convenient to examine the
decentralized equilibrium.
5.2. The Competitive Equilibrium of the Ricardian Economy
The competitive equilibrium of the Ricardian economy corresponds to the peculiar
case of the model in which the exponents of labour in the production functions are equal to
unity: α = β = 1. Given the constancy of marginal productivity of labour in the economic
sectors, the equilibrium price and effective government spending becomes independent of
labour allocation: p = (A/M)(εg)a-b, and (εg) = (ετA)1/(1-a) [equations (10) and (11) for α = β
= 1]. From equation (13) one deduces that the labour allocation to the manufacturing
industry in the Ricardian economy is given by:
(20) nc = nmax /(1+ θ),
where nmax is the maximum labour allocation to the manufacturing industry, i.e. the labour
allocation which is consistent with the satisfaction of the minimum primary good
consumption: C1(1-nmax) = γ. Developing this expression one deduces
(21)      [ ] .1)1(1 )a1/(1aaa1 ≤−−= −− Anmax εττγ
5.3. The Static Optimisation
A benevolent but shortsighted dictator –subject to Landes criticism– would only
allocate labour in order to maximize the representative consumer's instantaneous utility.
Substitution of equations (1) and (2), for α = β = 1, into equations (6) and (7), and these in
turn into the instantaneous utility function, equation (5), yields this dictator's objective
function:
(22)    [ ] [ ].)()1(log))(1()1(log)( ba gnMgnAtU ttt ετγετθ −+−−−=
The first order condition for maximization is obtained by differentiating this expression
with respect to nt and equating to 0:
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Solving for nt yields exactly the same solution of the competitive equilibrium as defined by
equations (20) and (21): nc. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium of the Ricardian
economy is optimal from the point of view of a benevolent dictator who ignores the
learning process of the industrial sector. In order to get this solution, use is made of the fact
that effective government spending, εg, is constant in this Ricardian economy (see section
5.2). The second order condition for maximization is satisfied automatically by the
concavity of the function objective.
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5.4. Dynamic Optimisation
A benevolent and completely informed dictator maximizes the intertemporal utility
function, equation (19), keeping in mind that utility at time t is defined by equation (22) and
that dynamics of industrial learning is given by equation (14). The control variable in the
moment t is the labour allocation, nt, and the state variable is the accumulated experience of
the industrial manufacturing sector, Mt, from which the productivity coefficient of the same
sector depends on. The Hamiltonian equation related to this problem is the following:[ ] [ ]{ } [ ] ,)()()1(log))(1()1(log bba gnMgnMgnAeH ttttttt εδλετγετθρ +−+−−−= −
where λt is the shadow price of accumulated experience in the industrial activity. It is
convenient to recall that effective government spending is constant in this Ricardian
economy. Thus the variable εg does not require a time subscript. The first order conditions
at moment t for maximization of intertemporal utility are given by the following equations:
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Moreover, the optimal trajectory of the economy should satisfy the following transversality
condition:
(26) .0lim =
∞→
ttt
Mλ
The last four equations determine the optimal growth path. This system of equations has a
non-linear structure that prevents its analytical solution. Nevertheless, some results can be
obtained. Firstly, comparison of equations (23) and (24) reveals that the optimal labour
allocation in a dynamic context –the solution to equation (24)– implies a higher
industrialization than the competitive equilibrium –the solution to equation (23)–; this
result is easily deduced from the fact that the left-hand side expression of these equations is
decreasing in n, the industrialization index. Secondly, in the balanced dynamic equilibrium
of this economy all variables should grow at constant rates and labour allocation should be
stable, no. Consequently the right-hand side expression of  equation (24) should be constant
along the path of balanced equilibrium. Differentiating this expression with respect to time
and equating to 0 yields that the variables λ and M should satisfy the following differential
equation along the balanced path equilibrium:
.0// =++ ρλλ tttt MM&&
Substituting the equations (14) and (25) in this expression solves for the value of
experience along the balanced path equilibrium:
(27)           ./ ρλ ρ ttt eM −=
This equation shows that the transversality condition is satisfied along the balanced
equilibrium: when t goes to infinity the value of experience tends to nil. Besides, by
combining equations (24) and (27) it is deduced that the optimal labour allocation along the
balanced path equilibrium, no, solves the following equation:
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This is a quadratic equation that can be solved explicitly for no. But it is convenient to show
the graphic solution.
Figure 6: Optimal Labour Allocation
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The value of the left-hand side expression of equation (28) is represented with the thick line
of  Figure 6 for n between 0 and nmax. The optimal solution for labour allocation is given by
the intersection of the thick line with the line that expresses the value of the right-hand side
of equation (28). The competitive solution to labour allocation is found where the thick line
intersects the horizontal axis [see equation (23)]. Hence the optimal labour allocation to the
manufacturing industrial activity is found between the competitive allocation and the
maximum allocation: nc < no < nmax. Thus, the optimal allocation to manufacturing activities
increases with the learning capacity of the industrial sector (∂no/∂δ > 0); it diminishes with
the discount rate (∂no/∂p < 0) –impatience does not help industrialization–; it increases with
government efficiency (∂no/∂ε > 0) and also with the productivity of the primary sector
(∂no/∂A > 0).
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6. Summary and Conclusions
6.1. Inheritances
The model developed in this paper embodies some basic characteristics of
Matsuyama’s 1992 model of learning-by-doing and comparative advantage, and Barro’s
1990 model of government spending. Like in Matsuyama, this model preserves the result
that high primary productivity induces industrialization and economic growth under
autarchy; on the other hand, comparative advantage of the primary sector induces
deindustrialization and a smaller economic growth in the context of an open economy. As
in Barro, this model generates the existence of an optimal tax rate; this is equal to the
elasticity product of effective government spending in the primary sector. The growth path
of the competitive equilibrium is sub-optimal because firms do not take into account the
external productive effects of government spending, and the learning effects derived from
the manufacturing activity. In this paper the long-run optimal labour allocation is revealed
for the special case of an economy with constant labour productivity (Ricardian economy).
6.2. Learning and Government Spending in Autarchy
The analysis of the interaction of both growth mechanisms, the specific object of
this paper, permits to conclude that government efficiency induces industrialization of the
country under autarchy. Besides, the government may support the trend to industrialization
by fixing the optimal tax rate.
Some interpretations based on the model for closed economies follow:
(1) The situation of some African countries can be understood from the point of view of
the model as cases of low primary productivity, deficient fiscal policy, and inefficient
public administration. As a result the region does not attain an economic take-off and
remains trapped in primary activities of low productivity.
(2) Efficient governments, and improvements in agricultural productivity by means of
technological change and land reforms, may have enhanced industrialization in Japan and
South Korea before they started to export manufacturing goods to the international markets.
(3) Inefficient governments and failure of land reform may contribute to explain the
relatively scarce industrialization of Colombia before the “apertura”.
6.3. Learning and Government Spending under an Open Trade Regime
The interaction of  both learning-by-doing  and government spending in an open
economy yields the following results. Comparative advantage is the fundamental
determinant of resource allocation in a small country. The government may play a role in
the country industrialization if and only if the impact of government spending on the
industrial manufacturing sector is stronger than it is on the primary sector. An empirical
analysis for Colombia support this result (Sanchez et al, 1996).
An interpretation of the Colombian “apertura” in the light of our model follows. It
has already been outlined how the failures of the Colombian governments may have
prevented a further industrialization process before the commercial openness. This history
CIDSE
23
matters. Based on equation (18), it can be claimed that commercial barriers to foreign
competition were lowered before Colombia had the opportunity to accumulate a
sufficiently high stock of manufacturing experience: M/M* < 1. The primary comparative
advantages were imposed: A/A* >> 1. Besides, low local government efficiency, ε/ε* < 1,
and unstable fiscal policies –there were almost a fiscal reform every two years during the
1990s–, prevented the governments to compensate the comparative advantage of the
primary sector. As a consequence deindustrialization was deepened, and economic growth
was weakened.
6.4. Industrial Policy
A dynamic exercise showed that there exists a space for industrial policy in
autarchy. Subsidies to the manufacturing industrial production financed with neutral taxes
can industrialize the country and  induce a higher economic growth. In the context of an
open trade regime governments authorities lose control of the allocation of resources; for
example, in the case of the Ricardian open economy complete specialization is imposed.
Consequently, the comparative advantage of the primary sector can act against any
industrial policy.
6.5. Some Warnings
This paper should not be interpreted as a call for protectionism. In the past industrial
protectionism gave an opportunity to the Colombian industrial elites to exploit the benefits
of the state –subsidies, subsidized credits, partial or total government financing, state
covering of the private risk– with no government requirements in terms of technological
investment or export targets. Given the protection, it was common for the industrial
manufacturing sector to use its market power to raise prices above international levels.
Hence, although arguments for protection of strategic infant industries are not inconsistent
with our model, it also contains arguments in favour of industrial policies, sound
government action for the provision of public goods, adoption of optimal tax schemes,
reduction of corruption and other leakages of the government spending policies, and, last
but not least, land reform (see the Annex).
Another warning. It is evident that not all countries that open up to international
trade can become industrialized countries. In such a case the deterioration of the terms of
trade for industrialized countries would be of such a magnitude that some countries would
find it convenient to return to primary activities. Therefore, in this model history matters.
The first industrialized countries take the lead.
The process of learning-by-doing here modelled is not the learning of a single
technology; sooner or later this type of learning is exhausted. Something like this is not
consistent with the linear learning technology of equation (3). The learning process should
be understood as a process of acquisition of productive abilities in an environment
characterized by the introduction of new goods (Lucas, 1988, 1993). In this way, the new
products set a permanent learning challenge to the industrial sector. For the case of
underdeveloped countries the own innovation may not be important, but the adoption of
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foreign technologies substitutes the necessity to innovate. This mechanism is also
compatible with a linear technology of learning.
Finally, this paper gives a partial explanation of the slowdown of the Colombian
economy since 1980. Although this explanation is consistent with the Colombian
experience in industrialization and economic growth (see Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 1 and
2), more empirical work is needed. Nevertheless, this paper contributes to build an
alternative vision of development that emphasises industrialization and good government as
required factors of economic growth.
Annex: The Optimal Tax Rate of a Small Country under an Open Trade Regime
In an open trade regime the manufacturing relative price is given by the terms of trade: p =
q. The representative consumer allocates his available income, I, between primary goods
and manufacturing goods according to the solution of the equation system given by the line
of consumption expansion, C1 = γ + θqC2 [equation (12)], and the budget constraint, C1 +
qC2 = I. It is easily deduced that both consumption types increase with available income: C1
= γ + θ (I-γ)/(1+θ) and C2 = (1/q)(I-γ)/(1+θ). Substituting in the instantaneous utility
function, the indirect function of utility is deduced: U(I,q) = log[θθ/(1+θ)1+θ] + (1+θ)log(I-
γ) – log(q). Instantaneous utility increases with available income. Therefore, since the terms
of trade are exogenously determined, the maximization of social welfare depends on the
maximization of available income, which is given by the following expression: I = (1-
τ)(X1+qX2). Substituting the production functions in the previous expression [equations (1)
and (2)], and combining the result with the equation (10) for p = q, and the equation (11), it
is deduced that available income is given by
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Consequently, the tax rate that, ceteris paribus, maximizes available income and social
welfare is given for τóptimal = a, as in the case of the country in autarchy. The last expression
also shows that even under an open trade regime the country obtain gains from a higher
primary productivity, A. Thus, land reform is a desirable objective even after the
“apertura”.
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Source: DNP (1998), DNP statistics (in www.dnp.gov.co) and DANE statistics (in
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Figure 2 
COLOMBIAN GDP GROWTH 
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